Environment; Cost or Expenses relating to Wrecked, Stranded, Abandoned and Sunken Ship
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The financial, legal, and environmental dimensions of managing wrecked, stranded, abandoned, and sunken vessels represent one of the most complex and high-stakes areas within contemporary maritime law. These issues extend far beyond the mere physical removal of a derelict ship; they encompass profound questions of environmental stewardship, navigational safety, financial accountability, and the intricate interplay between domestic statutes and international conventions. The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 serves as the foundational legal instrument in India, providing a structured framework for addressing claims related to these costly and perilous situations. This comprehensive analysis - expanded to its most authoritative length for the Sixteenth Edition (2026) - delves deeply into the relevant provisions of the Admiralty Act, 2017, the influence of key international conventions such as the 1993 Maritime Liens and Mortgage Convention, the landmark ratification by India of the Bunker Convention 2001 in early 2026, the Wreck Removal Convention 2007, and the Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention 1996, alongside the operational realities and legal transformations exposed by recent maritime incidents, including the catastrophic 2025 MSC ELSA-3 disaster off the coast of Kerala. The discussion navigates the statutory architecture, prioritization of claims, the procedural mandate for auctioning abandoned vessels, and the evolving jurisprudence that shapes India's response to maritime environmental threats in this transformative year.
Section 4(1)(v) of the Admiralty Act, 2017: The Core Provision for Wreck-Related Claims
At the heart of India's legal regime for dealing with derelict vessels lies Section 4(1)(v) of the Admiralty Act, 2017. This provision explicitly confers upon the High Courts jurisdiction to hear and determine any question on a maritime claim arising out of costs or expenses relating to the raising, removal, recovery, destruction, or rendering harmless of a vessel which is sunk, wrecked, stranded, or abandoned. This statutory language is deliberately broad and inclusive, ensuring that a wide spectrum of activities—from initial assessment and containment to complete removal and disposal—falls within the ambit of a maritime claim. The provision further extends to include anything that is or has been on board such vessel, thereby covering cargo, bunkers, equipment, and personal effects, which often pose separate environmental hazards. Moreover, Section 4(1)(v) explicitly encompasses costs or expenses relating to the preservation of an abandoned vessel and the maintenance of its crew, a humanitarian and logistical consideration that adds another layer of financial exposure for shipowners and insurers.
The scope of this provision is not merely theoretical. When a container vessel like the MSC ELSA-3 capsized approximately 38 nautical miles off Kochi on 25 May 2025, carrying 643 containers—many containing hazardous substances like calcium carbide, alongside 60 containers filled with billions of plastic nurdles, 84 metric tonnes of diesel, and 367 metric tonnes of furnace oil—the costs immediately fell under Section 4(1)(v) [citation:4][citation:5]. The raising or recovery of the vessel itself is a monumental engineering challenge, often requiring specialized salvage tugs, heavy-lift barges, and cutting-edge underwater cutting and patching technologies. The removal of debris and containers scattered across the seabed involves remotely operated vehicles and divers operating in hazardous conditions. The destruction or rendering harmless of the vessel might involve on-site dismantling or controlled demolition to eliminate future navigation threats. Each of these activities generates enormous expense, and the Admiralty Act, 2017, ensures that those who incur these costs—whether private salvors, port authorities, or the government—have the legal standing to pursue a maritime claim against the vessel and ultimately arrest it as security. The Indian Coast Guard's swift deployment of three Offshore Patrol Vessels and the specialized pollution control vessel ICGS Samudra Prahari, alongside daily aerial surveillance by Dornier aircraft, represented the immediate operational response, but the legal foundation for cost recovery rests squarely on Section 4(1)(v) [citation:8].
Section 9(4): Delineating the Limits of Maritime Liens for Environmental Claims
While Section 4(1)(v) establishes these costs as maritime claims, Section 9(4) of the Admiralty Act, 2017, provides a critical qualification regarding maritime liens. A maritime lien is a powerful in rem claim that attaches to the vessel itself from the moment the cause of action arises, granting the lienholder a high priority in the distribution of sale proceeds. However, Section 9(4) stipulates that no maritime lien shall attach to a vessel to secure a claim which arises out of or results from damage in connection with the carriage of oil or other hazardous or noxious substances by sea for which compensation is payable pursuant to any law for the time being in force. Similarly, claims resulting from the radioactive properties or combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or of radioactive products or waste are also excluded from maritime lien status.
This provision effectively means that for many of the most catastrophic environmental disasters—major oil spills or releases of hazardous chemicals—the claimant cannot rely on a maritime lien. Instead, the claimant's recourse is to pursue a statutory right to arrest the vessel under Section 4(1)(v) as a maritime claim, but the claim will rank lower in priority than maritime liens for crew wages, salvage, or tort claims for loss of life. This distinction has profound financial implications, particularly when the vessel's value is insufficient to satisfy all claims. It also underscores the importance of alternative compensation mechanisms, such as those provided under international conventions like the Bunker Convention—which India ratified in early 2026—and the HNS Convention, which India continues to evaluate for accession. The MSC ELSA-3 disaster starkly demonstrated that without such mechanisms, claimants face an uphill battle in securing adequate compensation for environmental damage and community losses [citation:4][citation:9].
Section 11(3): The Judicial Mandate for Auction of Abandoned Vessels
Abandonment of a vessel post-arrest presents unique challenges. The vessel continues to deteriorate, incurring custody costs, port charges, and potentially posing an escalating environmental threat. Section 11(3) of the Admiralty Act, 2017, addresses this scenario with a clear and time-bound judicial mandate. It provides that if the owner or demise charterer abandons the vessel after its arrest, the High Court shall cause the vessel to be auctioned and the proceeds appropriated and dealt with in such manner as the court may deem fit within a period of forty-five days from the date of arrest or abandonment. Crucially, the High Court is empowered to extend the period of auction for a further period of thirty days, but only for reasons to be recorded in writing.
This provision injects urgency and procedural discipline into what could otherwise become a protracted and expensive stalemate. The 45-day (extendable to 75-day) timeline ensures that abandoned vessels do not languish in Indian ports or anchorages, accumulating astronomical berth hire charges, security costs, and environmental risks. The mandate for recorded reasons for any extension imposes a check on judicial discretion, ensuring that delays are justified by genuine complexities—such as locating the owner, resolving title disputes, or awaiting environmental clearance for the auction—rather than mere administrative inertia. The auction process under Section 11(3) also crystallizes the distribution of proceeds, allowing prioritized claims to be satisfied and finally closing the chapter on the vessel's legal liabilities. In the aftermath of the MSC ELSA-3 sinking, the Kerala High Court's intervention—ordering MSC to pay ?1,200 crore towards environmental damage and community financial losses—demonstrates the judiciary's willingness to employ these provisions aggressively when environmental harm is evident [citation:4].
The 1993 Maritime Liens and Mortgage Convention: International Prioritization of Removal Costs
India, while not a signatory to all maritime conventions, aligns many of its principles with international best practices, particularly as reflected in the 1993 Maritime Liens and Mortgage Convention. Under this convention, wreck removal is no longer included in the list of claims that enjoy a maritime lien per se. However, Article 12(4) contains a crucial provision: to the extent that the removal is effected by a public authority in the interest of safe navigation or the protection of the marine environment, the costs of such removal shall be paid out of the proceeds of sale before all other claims secured by a maritime lien on the vessel [citation:6][citation:7]. This represents a significant policy choice, prioritizing public safety and environmental protection over even the most established private claims, such as crew wages or salvage.
This prioritization creates a powerful incentive for public authorities—such as the Indian Coast Guard, the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, or state maritime boards—to intervene proactively in wreck removal operations. If the Director General of Shipping orders the removal of a sunken vessel blocking a navigation channel, or the Coast Guard undertakes a massive oil spill cleanup operation, those costs are elevated to the highest priority when the vessel is eventually sold by court order. This ensures that public funds deployed for the common good are recoverable from the polluter's or owner's asset before any other creditor reaps the benefit. It is a cornerstone of the "polluter pays" principle embedded in international maritime law. The 1993 Convention's framework, as incorporated into Indian common law principles, provides the theoretical backbone for the priority rules applied by Indian High Courts in environmental claim distributions [citation:6].
India's Historic Ratification of the Bunker Convention 2001: A Turning Point
In a landmark development that fundamentally alters the legal landscape for ship-source pollution in India, the Union Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi approved India's accession to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (Bunker Convention) in early 2026. This decision, accompanied by amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, to give effect to the Bunker Convention, the Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention, and the Salvage Convention, represents the most significant legislative advancement in India's maritime environmental liability framework since the Admiralty Act, 2017 [citation:2]. The Bunker Convention ensures adequate, prompt, and effective compensation for damage caused by spills of oil when carried as fuel in ships' bunkers. The territorial jurisdiction for damage compensation extends to the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones, covering the vast majority of India's maritime interests. It applies to Indian vessels wherever they are situated and to foreign flag vessels while within Indian jurisdiction. The registered owner of every vessel above one thousand gross tonnage must maintain compulsory insurance cover, which allows claims for pollution damage to be brought directly against an insurer. Every such ship must carry a certificate on board evidencing that it maintains insurance or other financial security [citation:2].
This ratification directly addresses the legal vacuum that the MSC ELSA-3 disaster exposed. Had the Bunker Convention been in force at the time of that incident, Indian authorities and affected parties would have had direct recourse against MSC's insurers for the costs of the fishing ban compensation, environmental monitoring, and cleanup operations. The ratification does not retroactively apply to the MSC ELSA-3, but it ensures that future incidents—and there will be future incidents—will be governed by a clear, internationally recognized liability and compensation regime. The ratification also aligns India with the majority of major shipping nations, enhancing its credibility as a responsible maritime state and potentially reducing the incidence of forum shopping by owners seeking to avoid liability in non-convention jurisdictions [citation:7].
The Wreck Removal Convention 2007: India's Signatory Status and Implementation Path
The Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007, establishes a uniform international legal framework for the prompt and effective removal of wrecks that pose a hazard to navigation or the marine environment. It places the financial and operational responsibility squarely on the shipowner and requires compulsory insurance. India is a signatory to this convention, and the 2026 amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act are designed to bring its provisions into full domestic effect [citation:2][citation:3]. The convention applies to wrecks in the exclusive economic zone of a state party, allowing coastal states to take action to remove wrecks that pose a hazard, with the costs recoverable from the shipowner. Under the convention, the registered owner must maintain insurance or other financial security to cover liability under the convention, and a certificate to that effect must be carried on board. States parties are also required to establish mechanisms for reporting and locating wrecks, including the use of ship reporting systems and aids to navigation.
Prior to the 2026 amendments, India's domestic legislation lacked the direct enforceability and insurer provisions of the convention, leading to protracted negotiations, litigation, and significant delays before any removal action could commence. The Merchant Shipping Act amendments rectify this by incorporating the convention's core obligations into domestic law, providing Indian authorities with clear statutory authority to compel owners and their insurers to fund and undertake wreck removal operations. For the MSC ELSA-3 wreck, which remains a hazard to navigation and a continuing environmental threat, the implementation of the Wreck Removal Convention's principles—even if not retroactive—establishes a template for how similar incidents will be handled in the future. The convention's requirement for prompt action aligns with Section 11(3)'s 45-day auction timeline, creating a cohesive regime that prioritizes the removal of hazardous wrecks before they cause further damage [citation:3][citation:8].
The HNS Convention 1996: The Remaining Gap in India's Liability Framework
Despite the significant progress represented by the Bunker Convention ratification and the Wreck Removal Convention implementation, a critical vulnerability remains: India has not yet acceded to the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996 (HNS Convention) [citation:3][citation:9]. The HNS Convention creates a two-tier compensation regime for damage caused by hazardous and noxious substances carried by sea, similar to the oil pollution compensation model. The MSC ELSA-3 disaster brought this gap into sharp focus: the vessel was carrying 12 containers of calcium carbide (a highly reactive and hazardous substance that produces explosive acetylene gas when it contacts water), along with other undeclared or misdeclared dangerous cargoes. Under the HNS Convention, victims of pollution, response authorities, and those incurring cleanup or removal costs would have direct claims against shipowners' insurers and access to a supplementary international fund [citation:4][citation:5].
Without ratification, Indian authorities and affected parties remain without this framework, forced to rely on domestic legal processes that are less certain and more cumbersome. The HNS Convention's liability limits are significantly higher than those available under general maritime law, and the supplementary fund provides an additional layer of compensation when the shipowner's insurance is exhausted. The Indian government has indicated that it is actively evaluating accession to the HNS Convention, and the lessons of the MSC ELSA-3 disaster have accelerated this evaluation. Maritime experts and officials have argued that ratification is essential to complete India's international liability regime, as hazardous cargoes continue to transit Indian waters in increasing volumes. The Greenpeace India white paper on the MSC ELSA-3 disaster documented severe threats to marine biodiversity, loss of livelihoods for over one million coastal people, and significant gaps in corporate disclosure, all of which could have been addressed more effectively under the HNS framework [citation:4].
The MSC ELSA-3 Disaster: A Watershed Case Study in Legal and Operational Gaps and Responses
The capsizing of the MSC ELSA-3 on May 25, 2025, approximately 38 nautical miles off Kochi, serves as a watershed moment for Indian maritime law. This Liberian-flagged container vessel, with a length of 184 meters, was carrying around 643 containers, including at least 13 classified as hazardous substances, such as calcium carbide, alongside significant quantities of diesel and heavy fuel oil, and 60 containers filled with billions of plastic nurdles. While all 24 crew members were rescued, the sinking triggered widespread pollution concerns and exposed stark gaps in India's legal and operational preparedness. Within days of the sinking, the Indian Coast Guard issued early advisories to the Kerala state administration and activated coordination between key stakeholders to address potential oil or hazardous and noxious substance pollution scenarios. ICG teams engaged in tracking floating containers at sea and shared real-time alerts with local authorities to support shoreline preparedness. About 46 cargo containers washed ashore across three coastal districts of Kerala, with more debris expected [citation:4][citation:8].
The environmental and socio-economic devastation was immediate and severe. For small-scale fishers, the timing was devastating—the monsoon season is when the sea comes alive, breeding grounds flourish, and communities prepare for harvest. Instead, they woke to oil-soaked and torn nets, dead fish, stranded containers, and beaches littered with plastic pellets. Greenpeace India and SPARC surveyed coastal communities in Pulluvilla, Trivandrum, documenting that in just ten days, 235 households across 13 wards shared stories of lost nets, broken boats, and vanished income. The impacts recorded included severe threats to marine biodiversity (fish stocks and nesting grounds), loss of livelihoods and income for over one million coastal people (especially small-scale fisherfolk), and significant gaps in corporate disclosure, with MSC failing to publish cargo manifests or cleanup plans. The Kerala government called for ?9,531 crore in damages, though MSC denied serious harm [citation:4].
In response, the Indian government imposed a 20-nautical-mile fishing ban around the wreck. At the International Maritime Organization, India called for a review of container ship incidents, noting that recent cases "caused by undeclared hazardous cargoes" raised serious safety concerns. The legal challenges were immense. Without ratification of the Bunker and HNS Conventions at the time, India had no direct legal lever to compel the owner's insurers to cover the costs of the fishing ban compensation, environmental monitoring, or eventual removal of containers and wreckage. However, the judicial response was assertive: the Kerala High Court ordered MSC to pay ?1,200 crore towards environmental damage and community financial losses. Civil society mobilization was unprecedented: Greenpeace India and partners mobilized 50 cities across India and Sri Lanka between August 1–12, 2025, conducting postcard drives, street actions, and campus events. Over 5,116 postcards were signed and sent to MSC. The White Paper released on 28 July 2025 documented the spread of nurdles and toxic cargo across South Asia's coastline [citation:4].
The MSC ELSA-3 disaster is not merely an environmental or operational failure; it is a legal turning point. It galvanized calls within Indian maritime circles—from the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, legal practitioners, and environmental advocates—to urgently ratify the outstanding conventions. The Bunker Convention ratification in early 2026 is a direct consequence of this disaster's lessons. The incident demonstrates that the Admiralty Act, 2017, while comprehensive in defining maritime claims, cannot alone provide the international liability, compulsory insurance, and fund access mechanisms that the global conventions offer. The true cost of the MSC ELSA-3 will ultimately be measured not just in the physical cleanup but in the legal reforms it has driven, including the Bunker Convention accession and the accelerated implementation of the Wreck Removal Convention [citation:2][citation:4].
Tar Balls Management Rules 2026: A New Regulatory Frontier
Complementing the international convention ratifications, the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change released draft Tar Balls Management Rules, 2026, aimed at managing tar balls to protect the coastline and marine environment from oil spills. Tar balls are small, dark, sticky blobs of weathered oil that form in marine environments due to oil spills or natural seeps. They often accumulate on beaches and pose a danger to seabirds, fish, and marine animals such as sea turtles, which may mistakenly ingest them. India's western coast, particularly the area from Gujarat to Goa, is significantly affected by tar balls, especially during the seasonal period from April to September [citation:5].
The draft rules outline the responsibilities of the ministries involved in handling oil facilities, including the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, in addition to the Central Pollution Control Board, state governments, and district administrations. The rules assign responsibilities to state governments and district administrations for the environmentally sound management of tar balls. They propose the formation of State Level Crisis Management Groups under the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan established by the Indian Coast Guard. State governments are empowered to declare pollution from tar balls in coastal areas a state disaster and take action under the Disaster Management Act. They are responsible for the treatment, storage, and disposal of tar balls. The district administration is responsible for collection, handling, processing, and transportation of tar balls deposited along the district shoreline and must include tar ball management in the District Disaster Management Plan [citation:5].
The Indian Coast Guard is tasked with implementing the NOSDCP to effectively manage oil spills and the formation of tar balls. The ICG conducts regular aerial and surface surveillance for oil spills in Indian Exclusive Economic Zones and informs relevant stakeholders for necessary preparedness and response measures. Advanced technologies such as remotely operated vehicles and automated underwater vehicles may be utilized for detecting and managing underwater oil plumes during spill events. The 26th National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan meeting, hosted by the Indian Coast Guard in New Delhi in March 2026, reviewed the country's preparedness to respond effectively to oil spill contingencies in Indian waters, with 80 delegates from various ministries, central and state governments, ports, and oil handling agencies participating [citation:9].
Environmental and Financial Implications: Cost Components and Prioritization Under the Reformed Regime
Understanding the financial magnitude of dealing with wrecked, stranded, abandoned, and sunken ships requires a granular breakdown of cost components. These expenses are multifaceted and can rapidly escalate into the tens of millions of dollars, often exceeding the value of the vessel itself. The primary categories include physical recovery and removal costs, environmental cleanup and remediation, legal and administrative fees, and vessel preservation and crew maintenance. Under the reformed regime following the Bunker Convention ratification and Wreck Removal Convention implementation, the ability of public authorities to recover these costs has been significantly enhanced. The Indian Coast Guard's NOSDCP provides a coordinated framework for response, but the financial burden remains substantial [citation:5][citation:8].
Physical recovery and removal costs represent the core engineering expense. This includes mobilizing salvage tugs, heavy-lift cranes (which can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per day), specialized divers, ROVs, and cutting equipment. For a vessel like a large container ship or tanker, the cost of refloating a stranded vessel can range from $10 million to over $100 million. For a sunken vessel like the MSC ELSA-3, the cost of underwater cutting, piece-by-piece removal, and disposal can be equally astronomical. The depth of the wreck, its condition, seabed composition (rock, sand, coral), and presence of hazardous cargo all multiply these costs exponentially. Environmental cleanup and remediation covers all measures to mitigate, minimize, or remove pollution or damage to the environment, including deploying booms and skimmers to contain and recover spilled oil, applying dispersants, cleaning contaminated shorelines, wildlife rescue and rehabilitation, and long-term monitoring of ecosystem recovery. The MSC ELSA-3 scenario required extensive monitoring for calcium carbide reaction with water (which produces acetylene gas, a significant explosion risk), as well as fuel oil containment and nurdle recovery across thousands of kilometers of coastline [citation:4][citation:5].
Legal and administrative fees are the costs incurred in pursuing legal action, including filing admiralty suits, obtaining arrest orders, serving notices, engaging in interlocutory hearings regarding security or priority, and the ultimate distribution of proceeds. The Bunker Convention's direct action against insurers provision significantly reduces the legal burden for claimants, as they can proceed directly against the insurer rather than having to locate and serve the shipowner. Vessel preservation and crew maintenance costs, as mandated by Section 4(1)(v), can be substantial. An arrested vessel requires a caretaker crew to maintain safety, ensure compliance with port state control, operate generators for essential systems, and prevent deterioration. In the MSC ELSA-3 context, while the crew was rescued, the vessel itself and its scattered containers continue to require monitoring and, eventually, preservation or removal [citation:8].
Financial Responsibility and the Priority of Public Authority Costs Under the Reformed Framework
The primary financial responsibility for all these costs rests with the shipowner. However, the reality of maritime commerce often involves single-ship owning companies, limitation of liability, or outright financial insolvency. In such cases, public authorities—the Indian Coast Guard, the Directorate General of Shipping, state pollution control boards—may have to intervene to protect public safety and the environment. The legal framework, particularly the 1993 Convention and the principles embedded in the Admiralty Act, 2017, ensures that the costs incurred by public authorities for wreck removal in the interest of safe navigation or environmental protection are prioritized in the distribution of sale proceeds. Under Article 12(4) of the 1993 Convention, these costs are paid out of the proceeds before all other claims secured by a maritime lien on the vessel [citation:6]. This provision is critical to encourage public authorities to act swiftly without fear of being last in line for reimbursement.
The High Court's role in the auction process under Section 11(3) is to implement this prioritization. First, the costs and expenses of the arrest, seizure, and subsequent sale (including court fees and custodian charges) are deducted from the gross proceeds. Then, if the removal was effected by a public authority for safety or environmental reasons, those costs are paid next. Following that, claims secured by maritime liens (e.g., crew wages, salvage, and loss of life) are addressed in their statutory ranking. Finally, claims secured by registered mortgages and other maritime claims are paid in accordance with their priority. The residue, if any, is paid to the owner. This structured waterfall ensures that the most critical public interests are protected before private financial interests are satisfied. The Bunker Convention's compulsory insurance requirement adds an additional layer of financial security, as insurers are directly liable to claimants and cannot rely on the shipowner's potential insolvency to avoid payment [citation:2].
Abandonment: Distinguishing Between Crew Abandonment and Owner Abandonment
The concept of abandonment in maritime law is not monolithic. A vessel may be abandoned by its crew due to peril—for example, after a fire or grounding—leaving it adrift and a danger to other ships. Alternatively, a vessel may be abandoned by its owners, often for economic reasons, where the cost of recovery or debt exceeds the vessel's value. Section 4(1)(v) addresses both: it includes preservation of an abandoned vessel and maintenance of its crew. The reference to maintenance of the crew indicates that the drafters contemplated abandonment by the owner, because if the crew has abandoned the ship, the obligation to maintain them is not tied to the vessel preservation. However, in a crew-abandonment scenario, the vessel becomes a hazard, triggering the costs of removal or rendering harmless. The legal framework responds to both types, but the financial and procedural implications differ. Owner abandonment post-arrest triggers the mandatory auction timeline of Section 11(3), while crew abandonment (without owner abandonment) may still result in the vessel being treated as "abandoned" for the purposes of safety intervention by port authorities or the Coast Guard, with costs recoverable as a maritime claim under Section 4(1)(v). In the MSC ELSA-3 context, while the crew was rescued, the owners' initial response was characterized by transparency deficits, leading to community and governmental pressure for accountability [citation:4].
The Role of the High Court and Judicial Oversight in the Reformed Regime
The High Courts of India—particularly those with original admiralty jurisdiction, such as Bombay (Mumbai), Calcutta (Kolkata), Madras (Chennai), and Kerala (Kochi)—play a central role in the management of claims under Section 4(1)(v) and Section 11(3). The court's responsibility begins with admitting the admiralty suit, assessing whether a maritime claim exists, and ordering the arrest of the vessel as security. After arrest, the court oversees the vessel's custody, typically through a court-appointed receiver or custodian. If the owner fails to provide security or contest the arrest, and particularly if abandonment occurs, the court activates Section 11(3). The court determines whether to extend the 45-day auction period, but strictly requires recorded reasons for any extension, such as the need for environmental assessment, resolution of title disputes among co-owners, or waiting for a favorable weather window for removal prior to sale. The court also approves the terms of the auction, including the reserve price, the conditions of sale (e.g., "as is, where is"), and the distribution of proceeds. Throughout this process, the High Court acts as a guardian of both the claimant's rights and the public interest in safe navigation and environmental protection. The Kerala High Court's intervention in the MSC ELSA-3 aftermath—ordering MSC to pay ?1,200 crore—represents an aggressive exercise of this judicial oversight authority, signaling that Indian courts will not tolerate environmental degradation without commensurate financial accountability [citation:4].
Comparative Analysis: India's Reformed Legal Framework versus International Standards
When compared to leading maritime nations, India's framework for wreck-related costs and environmental claims has evolved significantly with the 2026 Bunker Convention ratification and Wreck Removal Convention implementation. The Admiralty Act, 2017, remains a modern and well-structured piece of legislation that clearly identifies environmental costs and wreck removal as maritime claims, provides for arrest, and includes a mandatory auction process for abandoned vessels. In many respects, it aligns with international best practices. The critical weakness that the MSC ELSA-3 exposed—the lack of compulsory insurance and direct action against insurers—has been substantially addressed by the Bunker Convention ratification [citation:2][citation:7].
For instance, Canada implements a comprehensive liability regime under its Marine Liability Act, which implements the 2010 HNS Protocol and provides access to a national Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund with no cap on compensating pollution damage. The United States operates under the Oil Pollution Act 1990 with its Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and stringent financial responsibility requirements for vessel operators. The United Kingdom and European Union member states have ratified all relevant conventions and benefit from the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds. In India, the Bunker Convention ratification brings India closer to this standard for bunker oil spills. However, the continued non-ratification of the HNS Convention remains a significant gap for hazardous cargo incidents, as the MSC ELSA-3 graphically demonstrated. Furthermore, India lacks the dedicated national spill response fund that exists in Canada and the US, though the Tar Balls Management Rules and NOSDCP provide a framework for coordinated response [citation:5][citation:9]. The operational readiness gap also remains: neither Vizhinjam nor Cochin had ocean-going tugs or sufficient equipment to fight fires or contain spills during the MSC ELSA-3 incident, and reliance on foreign resources from Singapore and Bahrain resulted in significant delays. India's operational legal readiness, while improving, still lags behind countries like Singapore (which maintains extensive industry stockpiles and pre-positioned response resources) and Norway (which operates 27 national spill depots with mandatory oil company funding via the NOFO fund) [citation:5].
Future Directions: HNS Ratification, National Spill Fund, and Operational Investment
The trajectory of Indian maritime law in the realm of wrecked, stranded, abandoned, and sunken ships points towards an inevitable and necessary convergence with international liability conventions. The MSC ELSA-3 disaster of 2025 has served as the catalyst. India must now prioritize the ratification of the HNS Convention to create a dedicated compensation fund for damage caused by hazardous and noxious substances. The Bunker Convention ratification and Wreck Removal Convention implementation were essential first steps, but they do not address the full spectrum of hazardous cargo risks. As maritime traffic increases and vessels carry ever more complex and dangerous cargoes, the absence of an HNS framework leaves India exposed to potentially catastrophic uncompensated losses [citation:3][citation:9].
Beyond convention ratification, India must invest in operational preparedness. The National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan must be not just aspirational but fully funded and regularly exercised. Tier-3 national stockpiles of spill response equipment should be established at strategic ports (Kochi, Mumbai, Chennai). Ports should be mandated to maintain tugs and booms. A single nodal agency with statutory powers to coordinate response should be designated. The Tar Balls Management Rules, 2026, represent a positive step in this direction, but they address only one aspect of the larger spill response challenge. The 26th NOSDCP meeting's focus on enhanced cooperation and adoption of best practices in emerging technologies indicates that the government recognizes these needs [citation:5][citation:9].
The lessons of the Sea Empress (1996), Prestige (2002), Erika (1999), X-Press Pearl (2021), and now MSC ELSA-3 (2025) are consistent: delay and inadequate preparation exponentially multiply the financial and environmental cost. India has the opportunity—and, given the growing traffic in its waters and strategic importance of its coastline, the imperative—to become a leader in maritime environmental protection. The path forward requires legislative action (HNS ratification), institutional investment (spill response infrastructure and funding), and a continued commitment to the principles of the Admiralty Act, 2017, as the cornerstone of admiralty jurisdiction. The Sixteenth Edition of this work records the state of the law as of 2026, with the expectation that future editions will document India's full accession to the international liability regime, including the HNS Convention and potentially the establishment of a national spill compensation fund [citation:4][citation:9].
Detailed Examination of Section 4(1)(v) – The Complete Text
Section 4(1)(v) of the Admiralty Act, 2017, reads in full: "costs or expenses relating to raising, removal, recovery, destruction or the rendering harmless of a vessel which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including anything that is or has been on board such vessel, and costs or expenses relating to the preservation of an abandoned vessel and maintenance of its crew." The use of the disjunctive "or" between each activity—raising, removal, recovery, destruction, rendering harmless—indicates that each is a separate and sufficient basis for a claim. A claimant need not have performed all these actions; any one will suffice. "Rendering harmless" is particularly significant, as it covers scenarios where the vessel is not physically removed but is made safe, for example, by pumping out pollutants, securing hatch covers, or neutralizing chemicals like calcium carbide. The inclusion of "anything that is or has been on board" ensures that claims for removal of cargo debris, containers, or even personal effects of the crew are included, which is critical in the container ship era—the MSC ELSA-3's 643 containers and billions of plastic nurdles fall squarely within this provision [citation:4][citation:8]. The preservation of an abandoned vessel and maintenance of its crew is a distinct sub-claim, acknowledging that until the vessel is sold or scrapped, human and asset considerations persist. This section remains the legal engine that drives most wreck-related admiralty litigation in India.
Detailed Examination of Section 9(4) – The Exceptions to Maritime Lien
Section 9(4) provides: "No maritime lien shall attach to a vessel to secure a claim which arises out of or results from— (a) damage in connection with the carriage of oil or other hazardous or noxious substances by sea for which compensation is payable to the claimants pursuant to any law for the time being in force; (b) the radioactive properties or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or of radioactive products or waste." The phrase "pursuant to any law for the time being in force" is critical. With the Bunker Convention ratification and the amendment of the Merchant Shipping Act to give effect to that convention, India now has a "law for the time being in force" that provides compensation for bunker oil pollution damage. Consequently, claims falling under the Bunker Convention regime would not attract a maritime lien under Section 9(4)(a) [citation:2]. However, for HNS claims, because India has not yet ratified the HNS Convention and has not enacted a standalone domestic compensation law, there is no "law for the time being in force" that would displace the maritime lien for such claims. This creates an anomalous situation where HNS claims—like those arising from the MSC ELSA-3's calcium carbide and other hazardous cargo—could arguably still attract a maritime lien, while bunker oil claims no longer do. This ambiguity reinforces the need for either HNS ratification or a standalone domestic compensation fund to provide clarity and certainty [citation:4][citation:9].
Detailed Examination of Section 11(3) – The Auction Mandate
Section 11(3): "If the owner or demise charterer abandons the vessel after its arrest, the High Court shall cause the vessel to be auctioned and the proceeds appropriated and dealt with in such manner as the court may deem fit within a period of forty-five days from the date of arrest or abandonment. Provided that the High Court shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period of auction of the vessel for a further period of thirty days." The word "shall" imposes a mandatory duty on the court; there is no discretion to refrain from auctioning if abandonment has occurred. The 45-day clock starts from either the date of arrest or the date of abandonment, whichever is later, but the reference to "arrest or abandonment" gives flexibility. The court's power to extend is limited to 30 days and only for written reasons. This provision is designed to prevent the court from indefinitely postponing the sale, which would prejudice claimants and perpetuate the vessel's hazardous presence. In practice, the court will often extend to allow for a proper environmental assessment before auction, given that a potential buyer must understand the remediation liabilities. The auction proceeds are then a fund for distribution, with priority as discussed. In the MSC ELSA-3 context, although the vessel itself is sunken and not subject to traditional auction, the principles of Section 11(3)—urgent action, recorded reasons for delays, and prioritized distribution of any proceeds from the vessel or its insurers—inform the judicial approach to similar incidents [citation:8].
The Interplay Between Sections 4(1)(v), 9(4), and 11(3) in Litigation Under the Reformed Regime
In a typical litigation scenario following the Bunker Convention ratification, a claimant—such as the Indian Coast Guard that has incurred significant costs in containing an oil spill and arresting a vessel—will file an admiralty suit claiming a maritime claim under Section 4(1)(v). The court will order arrest. If the owner fails to appear or makes it clear they have no intention of defending or providing security (abandonment), the claimant will move the court under Section 11(3) for an early auction. The court will set a timeline. The sale proceeds are paid into court. The distribution phase then involves competing claims: perhaps a bank with a registered mortgage, a crew with wage claims, and the Coast Guard with cleanup costs. The Coast Guard will argue that its costs are for removal in the interest of safe navigation and environmental protection and should be prioritized even over maritime liens (citing the principle from the 1993 Convention as incorporated into Indian common law) [citation:6]. Additionally, under the Bunker Convention, the Coast Guard or affected claimants can bring direct claims against the vessel's insurer, bypassing the shipowner entirely [citation:2]. The interplay between these sections, combined with the new convention provisions, determines not just who gets paid, but how quickly cleanup can commence and how effectively environmental damages are compensated.
Global Trends in Wreck Removal and Environmental Cost Recovery
Globally, the trend is towards stricter liability and greater financial assurance for wreck removal and pollution incidents. The 2007 Wreck Removal Convention has been ratified by over 75 states as of 2026, creating a near-universal standard for prompt removal of hazardous wrecks. Many states, including the United Kingdom, France, and Japan, have enacted domestic laws that go beyond the conventions, creating national funds for orphaned wrecks where the owner is unknown or insolvent. The European Union has adopted the Environmental Liability Directive, which applies the "polluter pays" principle strictly to maritime incidents. In this context, India's Bunker Convention ratification and Wreck Removal Convention implementation have brought India into alignment with the global mainstream, but the HNS ratification gap remains increasingly anomalous. The International Maritime Organization continues to urge India to ratify the HNS Convention, and the Indian maritime industry has voiced support, recognizing that full ratification would level the playing field with competitors from convention states. The legal landscape is moving toward a model where every vessel entering a port or passing through an exclusive economic zone must demonstrate valid insurance covering wreck removal, pollution (bunker and HNS), and crew welfare. India's future adherence to this model appears not just advisable but inevitable [citation:3][citation:9].
Practical Advice for Claimants and Shipowners in the Reformed Regime
For claimants seeking to recover costs under Section 4(1)(v) following the Bunker Convention ratification, the most effective strategy is swift action: act immediately to arrest the vessel before it leaves territorial waters, meticulously document all costs incurred, preserve evidence of the hazard or pollution, and engage specialist admiralty solicitors familiar with the procedures of the High Court. Claimants should also be aware that under the Bunker Convention, they can bring direct claims against the vessel's insurer, which significantly simplifies the recovery process and reduces the risk of the shipowner's insolvency affecting compensation. For HNS claims, claimants should advocate for India to ratify the HNS Convention, as that would create similar direct insurance claims and fund access. For shipowners and their insurers, the message is equally clear: maintain valid P&I club cover that explicitly includes wreck removal, bunker pollution liability, and—where applicable—HNS liability for Indian waters. The Bunker Convention's compulsory insurance requirement means that shipowners without valid certificates risk detention and significant penalties. Respond promptly to any incident to avoid the vessel being classified as "abandoned." Provide security or caveats against arrest to prevent Section 11(3) auctions that may yield lower proceeds than a private sale. Understanding the timeline of Sections 4(1)(v) and 11(3) is essential; the 45-day clock is unforgiving, and owners who fail to engage will find their vessel sold out from under them [citation:2][citation:8].
The Role of Specialized Admiralty Practitioners in the Evolving Regime
The complexity of the reformed legal framework—integrating the Admiralty Act, 2017, the Bunker Convention provisions, the Wreck Removal Convention implementation, the Tar Balls Management Rules, and the pending HNS Convention—demands specialized legal expertise. Claimants, shipowners, insurers, and public authorities require counsel who understand not only the domestic statutory architecture but also the international convention landscape and the practical realities of vessel arrest, security procurement, and proceeds distribution. The Indian High Courts' admiralty jurisdiction, exercised primarily in Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, and Kochi, has developed a sophisticated body of practice that balances the competing interests of environmental protection, navigational safety, commercial creditors, and seafarers' welfare. Recent judicial trends, including the expanded interpretation of "beneficial ownership" for sister ship arrests and the courts' willingness to pierce the corporate veil to reach ultimate owners, demonstrate an increasingly claimant-friendly orientation when environmental harm is alleged [citation:7]. Practitioners must remain current with these developments to effectively represent their clients' interests in this dynamic field.
Looking Ahead: The Seventeenth Edition and Anticipated Legal Evolution
It is anticipated that the Seventeenth Edition of this work will document further landmark changes in India's maritime environmental liability regime. Pressure is mounting from the shipping industry, environmental groups, and the judiciary for the government to ratify the HNS Convention. The MSC ELSA-3 disaster has been a wake-up call, leading to parliamentary discussions and a reported push from the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways to expedite accession to the HNS Convention. If ratified, the Admiralty Act, 2017, may require consequential amendments to harmonize with the new international obligations, particularly regarding HNS claims and the establishment of national funds. The Tar Balls Management Rules, once finalized, will add a new layer of regulatory oversight for chronic low-level pollution. The continued refinement of the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan, with regular exercises and updated equipment stockpiles, will enhance operational readiness. The legal framework for wrecked, stranded, abandoned, and sunken ships is on a trajectory to become one of the most robust in the world, aligning India's regime with the best practices of the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Until full HNS ratification is achieved, however, the Admiralty Act, 2017, remains the essential instrument, and the principles outlined in this chapter—prioritization of public authority costs, strict timelines for auction, and broad definition of maritime claims—will continue to guide the Indian courts. The Sixteenth Edition (2026) captures a moment of transformative change, recording India's significant progress while acknowledging the work that remains [citation:2][citation:4][citation:9].
Final Observations on the State of Indian Maritime Environmental Law in 2026
The legal and financial management of wrecked, stranded, abandoned, and sunken ships under Indian admiralty law is a dynamic and increasingly critical field that has undergone profound transformation in 2026. The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, through Sections 4(1)(v), 9(4), and 11(3), provides a robust statutory foundation that clearly classifies environmental and wreck-related costs as maritime claims, mandates judicial oversight, and ensures timely auction of abandoned vessels. The prioritization of public authority costs for safe navigation and environmental protection, derived from international convention principles, represents sound public policy that has been tested and validated in the aftermath of major incidents. The Bunker Convention ratification and Wreck Removal Convention implementation in early 2026 have substantially closed the legal gaps that the MSC ELSA-3 disaster exposed, providing compulsory insurance, direct action against insurers, and clear financial security requirements for vessel operators. The Tar Balls Management Rules and the ongoing refinement of the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan demonstrate the government's commitment to operational preparedness, though significant investment in equipment and infrastructure remains necessary [citation:2][citation:4][citation:5].
The HNS Convention remains the most significant outstanding gap. Until India ratifies the HNS Convention, incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances—like the calcium carbide and plastic nurdles carried by the MSC ELSA-3—will continue to present compensation challenges that are not fully addressed by the existing framework. The Indian government's expressed intention to evaluate HNS accession suggests that this gap will be addressed in the near term, and the Seventeenth Edition of this work will likely document that achievement. The lessons of the MSC ELSA-3 disaster—the severe threats to marine biodiversity, the loss of livelihoods for over one million coastal people, the gaps in corporate disclosure, and the need for clear accountability mechanisms—have permanently altered the discourse around maritime environmental liability in India. The collective response—from the Indian Coast Guard's swift operational deployment to Greenpeace India's citizen-led documentation and advocacy to the Kerala High Court's assertive judicial intervention—demonstrates that India has the institutional capacity and political will to enforce environmental accountability, but only when the legal framework provides the necessary tools [citation:4][citation:8].
Practitioners, shipowners, insurers, and public authorities must continue to navigate the existing framework with skill and foresight, while advocating for the final piece of the international liability puzzle: HNS Convention ratification. The Sixteenth Edition (2026) serves as the definitive guide to that journey, capturing a moment when India took decisive steps toward comprehensive maritime environmental protection while acknowledging the work that remains. The Sixteenth Edition of this work records the state of the law as of 2026, with the expectation that future editions will document India's full accession to the international liability regime, the operationalization of enhanced spill response capabilities, and the continued evolution of admiralty jurisprudence in the service of environmental protection and navigational safety.